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Abstract—Federated learning, i.e., a mobile edge computing
framework for deep learning, is a recent advance in privacy-
preserving machine learning, where the model is trained in a
decentralized manner by the clients, i.e., data curators, pre-
venting the server from directly accessing those private data
from the clients. This learning mechanism significantly chal-
lenges the attack from the server side. Although the state-of-
the-art attacking techniques that incorporated the advance of
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) could construct class
representatives of the global data distribution among all clients, it
is still challenging to distinguishably attack a specific client (i.e.,
user-level privacy leakage), which is a stronger privacy threat
to precisely recover the private data from a specific client. This
paper gives the first attempt to explore user-level privacy leakage
against the federated learning by the attack from a malicious
server. We propose a framework incorporating GAN with a multi-
task discriminator, which simultaneously discriminates category,
reality, and client identity of input samples. The novel discrim-
ination on client identity enables the generator to recover user
specified private data. Unlike existing works that tend to interfere
the training process of the federated learning, the proposed
method works “invisibly” on the server side. The experimental
results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed attacking
approach and the superior to the state-of-the-art.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, modern deep learning technique is beginning
to emerge in the networking domain, such as a crowdsourced
system for learning tasks. But utilizing conventional cen-
tralized training methodology requires local storage of the
crowdsourced data, which suffers from the high volume of
traffic, highly computational demands and privacy concerns.
For collectively reaping the benefits of the shared model
trained from this rich data without the need to store it centrally,
distributed learning framework was proposed, serving as a
mobile edge computing framework for deep learning. Shokri
et al. [1] proposed the collaborative learning DSSGD, where
the data providers, i.e., clients, train locally on a shared model,
and then the server will collect those local models/updates to
estimate/update a global model instead of directly assessing
the private data from clients. Then, the global model is sent
back to clients, iterating the aforementioned local training
process. In the same token, federated learning [2] proposed
a variant of decentralized learning with higher efficiency.
The key improvement lies in the way of updating the global
model, i.e., DSSGD performs the aggregated update while
1This manuscript has been accepted by IEEE INFOCOM 2019.
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Fig. 1: The framework of federated learning. The server sends
the shared model to each client, which trains the shared
model locally by its private data. Then, the update from
each client is uploaded to the server, where those updates
are aggregated/averaged to improve the shared model in a
collaborative manor.
the federated learning conducts the averaged update, which is
more suitable for the commonly non-IID and unbalanced data
distribution among clients in the real world. Fig. 1 illustrates
the framework of federated learning.
However, recent works demonstrated that the collaborative
learning is vulnerable to the inference attack, e.g., reconstruc-
tion attack and membership attack, by malicious servers/clients
because the shared model is updated according to those private
data, whose pattern is encoded into the model parameters.
Therefore, if a corresponding decoder could be constructed,
the private data or statistics will be recovered inversely. Under
the assumption of a malicious server, Aono et al. [3] partially
recovered the private data based on the observation that the
gradient of weights is proportional to that of the bias at the first
layer of the model, and their radio approximates to the training
input. But it could only apply to a simplified setting where the
training batch has only one sample. Hitaj et al. [4] proposed
a GAN-based reconstruction attack against the collaborative
learning by assuming a malicious client, which utilized the
shared model as the discriminator to train a GAN [5]. Even-
tually, the learned generator (equivalent to the decoder) will
successfully mimic the training samples. Although [4] had
demonstrated the effectiveness of GAN-based attack against
DSSGD, it presents mainly three limitations: 1) It would
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change the architecture of the shared model and introduce
adversarial influence to the learning process, while the former
unrealistically assumes a powerful malicious client, and the
latter compromises the learning process. 2) The GAN-based
attack suffers from performance degradation when attacks the
federated learning because the adversarial influence introduced
by the malicious client would become trivial after the average
update. 3) In addition, the GAN-based attack could only
infer class-wised representatives, which are generic samples
characterizing class properties rather than the exact samples
from the clients [6].
Motivated by those drawbacks in existing reconstruction
attacking techniques, we propose a more generic, practical,
and invisible attacking framework against the federated learn-
ing without affecting the learning process. In addition, we
further target client-level privacy2, which is more challenging
and empirically meaningful than globally recovering the data
representatives that characterize the population distribution as
in the GAN-based attack. Instead of assuming a malicious
client, the proposed method performs on the server side, which
first explores the attack by a malicious server. Specifically,
we adapt the original GAN to a multi-task scenario where
reality, category, and identity of the target client are considered
simultaneously. On the one hand, performing additional tasks
when training the GAN improves the quality of synthesized
samples [7] without the necessity of modification on the
shared model or compromising to the federated learning,
achieving invisible attack. On the other hand, the novel task
of discriminating client identity enables client-level privacy
recovery. For simplicity, the proposed framework is referred
to as multi-task GAN for Auxiliary Identification (mGAN-AI).
The key novelty of mGAN-AI is to compromise the client-
level privacy that is defined as the client-dependent properties,
which specifically characterize the corresponding client and
distinguish the client from the others. The key of achieving the
discrimination on client identity is to obtain data representa-
tives from each individual client, such that the training of GAN
can be supervised by the identity representatives, generating
samples with specific identity (i.e., from a specific client).
Since the client data is unaccessible, we adopt an optimization-
based method to estimate such data representatives from those
accessible updates from the clients. The mGAN-AI relaxes the
assumption that clients own mutually exclusive class labels,
achieving a more generic attack to the federated learning.
In summary, our contributions are mainly in three-fold:
• To the best of our knowledges, we first explore the attack
from the perspective of a malicious server against the
federated learning. In addition, beyond inferring class-
wised representatives, we step further to recover user-
level privacy in an invisible manner.
• Correspondingly, we propose the generic attacking frame-
work mGAN-AI that incorporates a multi-task GAN,
which conducts a novel discrimination on client identity,
achieving attack to user-level privacy.
2In this paper, “user-level” and “client-level” are used interchangeably.
• Exhaustive experimental evaluation is conducted to
demonstrate the effectiveness and superior of the pro-
posed mGAN-AI as compared to existing works. On
the MNIST and AT&T datasets, mGAN-AI successfully
recovers the samples from a specific user.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the related works on privacy-preserving distributed
learning and attack models. Section III briefs the background
knowledge. The threat models are discussed in section IV, and
then the proposed mGAN-AI attack is detailed in sections V.
Extensive experimental evaluation is conducted in section VI.
Finally, section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
This section provides the background of privacy-preserving
related learning methods, as well as corresponding attacking
approaches.
A. Privacy-preserving Distributed Learning
Distributed learning frameworks can be categorized accord-
ing to the updating mechanism of the shared model. [1]
summarized the updates while [2], [8] averaged the updates,
which outperform asynchronous approaches in aspects of com-
munication efficiency and privacy preservation [9]. Existing
works on privacy-preserving distributed learning mostly utilize
either differential privacy mechanism (DP) or secure multi-
party computation (MPC). Pathak et al. [10] proposed a
DP-based global classifier by aggregating the locally trained
classifiers. Hamm et al. [11] leveraged knowledge transfer
from ensemble local models to a global differentially pri-
vate model. DSSGD [1] was the first collaborative learning
mechanism dealing with practical distribution, which used
sparse vector [12] to realize DP. Recently, participant-level
differentially private distributed learning method [13] was
proposed to further protect the membership information of
participants. Utilizing MPC, Mohassel et al. [14] presented
the SecureML framework where a global model is trained on
the clients’ encrypted data among two non-colluding servers.
Other methods based on encryption include secure sum pro-
tocol [15] that uses a tree topology, homomorphic encryption,
and secure aggregation protocol [16].
B. Attacks on the Learning Model
The inference attack, e.g., membership attack and recon-
struction attack, aims to infer the private features of the train-
ing data against a learning model. The membership attack [6],
[17], [18] is to decide whether a given sample belongs to
the training dataset. Shokri et al. [17] mounted the attack by
utilizing the difference between model outputs from training
and non-training inputs, respectively. Hayes et al. [18] used
GAN to detect overfitting of the target model and recognize
inputs through the discriminator which could distinguish dif-
ferent data distributions. Melis et al. [6] first proposed the
membership attack against the collaborative/federated learning
and further inferred the properties by a batch property clas-
sifier. By contrast, the reconstruction attack aims to construct
the training samples by accessing a learning model [3], [4],
[19]. Fredrikson et al. [19] proposed the model inversion (MI)
attack to recover images from a face recognition service by
maximizing the confidence values with respect to a white noise
image. Against collaborative/federated learning framework,
Aono et al. [3] partially recovered private data of the clients
based on the proportionality between the training data and
the updates sent to the server (assuming a malicious server).
Hitaj et al. [4] assumed a malicious client in the federated
learning, where the malicious client has white-box access
to the model at every training iteration. Utilizing GAN to
synthesize samples, this attack successfully reconstructed the
private data of other clients.
This paper proposes a GAN-based reconstruction attack
against the federated learning from the perspective of a ma-
licious server, unlike related works that failed to threaten the
federated learning in a practical and invisible manner. For ex-
ample, [3] could only be applied to a simplified setting where
the training batch has only one sample, and [4] performed the
attack by modifying the architecture of the shared model which
is beyond the power of a malicious client, and it introduced
negative influence into the standard training process, tending
to worsen the shared model.
III. PRELIMINARY
A. Federated Learning
Compared to the conventional training methods that require
to directly access private data from clients, federated learning
presents significant advantages in privacy preservation because
of the distributed learning, where the clients share and train
the model locally without uploading their private data to the
server. Fig. 2 illustrates the proposed mGAN-AI, as well as
the federated learning. There are N clients, each of which
owns its private dataset. During the learning, clients agree on
a common objective and model structure. At each iteration, the
parameters of current model are downloaded from the server
to clients, and then the model is trained locally on each client.
Finally, those local updates are sent back to the server, where
the updates are averaged and accumulated to the current shared
model. Eq. 1 expresses the update of the shared model.
Mt+1 =Mt +
1
N
N∑
k=1
ukt , (1)
where Mt denotes the shared model at the tth iteration, and
ukt indicates the update from the kth client at iteration t.
[2] demonstrated that a valid model could be achieved by
averaging the updates only if the clients receive the model
with the same initialization. The federated learning satisfies
this condition.
B. Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative adversarial nets (GANs) were first proposed by
Goodfellow [5], which could generate samples indistinguish-
able from those training/real samples. It consists of a generator
G and a discriminator D. The generator G draws random
samples z from a prior distribution (e.g., Gaussian or uniform
distribution) as the inputs, and then G generates samples
from z. Given a training set, the discriminator D is trained
to distinguish the generated samples from the training (real)
samples. Eq. 2 shows the objective of GANs.
min
G
max
D
V (D,G) =Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)]+
Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))],
(2)
where pdata and pz denote the training/real distribution and
prior distribution, respectively. The two models G and D are
trained alternately until this minimax game achieves Nash
equilibrium, where the generated samples are difficult to be
discriminated from the read ones. Theoretically, the global
optimum is achieved at pdata = pg [5], where pg indicates
the distribution of generated samples.
IV. THREAT MODEL
This section introduces the threat model of the proposed
mGAN-AI framework, and then the generality and rationality
of assuming a malicious server in mGAN-AI is demonstrated
as compared to related works.
A. Learning Scenario
Following the training procedure of federated learning as de-
scribed in Sec. III-A, we assume N (N ≥ 2) clients that agree
on a common learning objective and train collaboratively on a
shared model. Without loss of generality, the data of all clients
is considered as non-IID distributed, which is also consistent
with the settings of federated learning [2]. Specifically, the
data distribution of an arbitrary client k (k = 1, 2, · · · , N ) is
independent from that of the other clients, and thus bias from
the global distribution of all clients. The biased distribution
pk of the client k is considered as its client-level privacy. For
simplicity, the shared model adopts an image classifier in the
rest of this paper.
B. Malicious Server
The server in the federated learning is assumed to be
malicious, aiming to reconstruct private data of the victim,
which refers to the target client, for implementing the client-
level privacy attack. The malicious server could either only
analyze the periodic updates from the clients (i.e., passive
attack), or even intentionally isolate the shared model trained
by the victim to achieve more powerful attack (i.e., active
attack). By contrast, most existing attacks against the collabo-
rative/federated learning assumed malicious clients, which are
limited at the stage of recovering class-wised representatives
rather than prying client-level privacy because the malicious
clients can only access aggregated updates (contributed by all
the clients) from the server, while client-level attack requires
individual update from each client. Although there are attacks
targeting at certain clients [4], [6], they impractical assumed
that class labels of the clients are mutually different or required
extra information of the target client, e.g., class labels or other
client-wise properties. More importantly, they would compro-
mise the performance of the shared model. For example, [6]
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Fig. 2: Illustration of the proposed mGAN-AI from a malicious server in the federated learning. There are N clients, and the
vth client is attacked as the victim. The shared model at the tth iteration is denoted as Mt, and ukt denotes corresponding
update from the kth client. On the malicious server, a discriminator D (orange) and generator G (blue) are trained based on
the update uvt from the victim, the shared model Mt, and representatives Xk, Xv from each client. Xaux denotes an auxiliary
real dataset to train D on the real-fake task.
changed the training objective, and [4] changed the shared
model and introduced mislabeled samples into the training.
Considering the limitation and drawback of malicious clients,
we assume a malicious server that would overcome all above
problems. The malicious server rigidly follows the rules of
federated learning. Meanwhile, the passive and active attacks
are performed without effecting on the learning process, i.e.,
shared model, objective, updates, etc.
C. Communication Protocol
In our threat model, the shared model is exchanged be-
tween the server and clients in plain text like [2], rather
than in a encryption-based protocol [16], [20]. Intuitively,
the encryption-based aggregation prevents the adversary from
accessing the updates of the clients, thus preserving their pri-
vacy. However, recent works [4], [6], which only accessed the
aggregated updates, could compromise the clients’ privacy by
introducing adversarial influence. In addition, the encryption-
based aggregation also prevents the server from evaluating
the utility of clients’ updates, degrading the learning model
when malicious clients exist. [16] discussed the weakness
of encryption-based protocol that it cannot guarantee the
correctness of federated learning if there are malicious clients.
V. APPROACH
This section details the proposed mGAN-AI attack against
the federated learning for reconstructing private data of a spe-
cific victim. The main idea is to design a multi-task GAN that
could discriminatingly learn the real data distribution of the
victim. Section V-A gives a high-level overview of mGAN-AI,
and Section V-B details the structure of the GAN with a novel
multi-task discriminator, which first achieves discrimination on
client identity. Then, sections V-C and V-D discuss the passive
attack and active attack, respectively. The former performs
in an invisible fashion, while the latter slightly interferes
the share model but achieving more powerful attack. Finally,
section V-E further details the inference of client-level privacy.
A. Overview of mGAN-AI
The principle of GAN is to train a discriminator on target
data and generated data simultaneously. Eventually, the cou-
pled generator would yield samples close to target ones. In the
proposed mGAN-AI, the idea of training a GAN is borrowed,
but the malicious server cannot access the target data (i.e.,
client-level private data) in the scenario of federated learning.
However, the shared model is trained locally on each client,
equivalent to training a discriminator (with the same structure
as the shared model) on the target data. Intuitively, directly
obtaining the target data to train a discriminator is equivalent
to obtaining the network update after feeding the target data to
the discriminator. In the federated learning, the only accessible
information to the malicious server is the updates from clients,
which provide the update to the discriminator after training on
the target data. For the generated data, it can be easily obtained
from the corresponding generator. Therefore, the advance of
GAN could be utilized in the federated learning. In addition,
since GANs could generate conditioned samples if supervised
by the condition in training [21], we could train mGAN-
AI conditoned on the updates from victim, thus it could
generate victim-conditioned samples, i.e., client-level privacy.
Fig. 2 overviews the proposed mGAN-AI. Assume N
clients, and the vth client is the victim whose data would be
reconstructed by the malicious server. The malicious server
acts as a normal server in the federated learning, while at the
same time it is also an adversary. At the tth iteration, the
malicious server sends the current shared model Mt to each
of the N clients and then receives the updates u1t , u
2
t , · · · , uNt
from them after training on their private data. Specially, uvt
denotes the update from the victim. For reconstructing the
private data of the victim, we propose a new variant of
GAN with a multi-task discriminator, which simultaneously
discriminates category, reality, and client identity of input
samples. Noted that the structure of the discriminator is the
same as the shared model regardless of the output layer. Thus,
the update uvt from the victim v could be either aggregated to
the latest shared model and then to update the discriminator
(passive attack) or aggregated to the discriminator directly
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Fig. 3: Structure comparison between the GAN-based attack
(a) [4] and the proposed mGAN-AI (b).
(active attack). Besides, representatives of each client are
calculated to supervise the training of D on identity. Then, the
updated discriminator is trained on generated samples from
the generator. Correspondingly, the generator is updated to
approach the data from the victim. In the following, we will
introduce the structure of the proposed multi-task GAN model.
B. Structure of the Multi-task GAN
Specifically, the discriminator of mGAN-AI is designed to
achieve three tasks: 1) real-fake discrimination like standard
GAN, 2) categorization on input samples, which performs like
the shared model, further increasing the quality of generated
samples [7], and 3) identification on the input sample to distin-
guish the victim from other clients. The novel discrimination
on identity is the key to violate user-level privacy. Fig. 3b
shows the multi-task GAN in the proposed mGAN-AI, where
the discriminator D shares the structure with the shared model
except the output layer because the output format of the three
tasks are different. Compared to the GAN-based attack [4],
mGAN-AI incorporates discrimination on identity that is also
fed to G as an important condition. The network structure of
D for each task in mGAN-AI is illustrated in the following,
Dreal = Sigmoid (FCreal(Lshare))
Dcat = Softmax (FCcat(Lshare))
Did = Sigmoid (FCid(Lshare)) ,
(3)
where Dreal, Did, and Dcat denote the discriminator tasks
of real-fake, identification, and categorization, respectively.
Correspondingly, FCid and FCcat are the fully connection
layer (i.e., output layer). Lshare indicates the layers from the
shared model except the output layer.
The generator G accepts category and identity labels, as well
as the noise (z), to conditionally yield user specified samples.
The objectives are expressed in Eq. 4.
Lreal = Ex∼preal [logDreal(x)]+
Ex∼pfake [log(1−Dreal(x))]
Lcat = Ex,y∼pfake [CE(Dcat(x), y)]
Lid = Ex∼pvictim [logDid(x)]+
Ex∼pother [log(1−Did(x))],
(4)
where x ∼ pvictim and x ∼ pother denote the data sampled
from the victim and the other clients, respectively. However,
the samples from the victim or the other clients are inac-
cessible for the malicious server. Therefore, we estimate the
representatives of each client based on their updates to the
server. More details will be discussed later in section V-E. Note
that x ∼ preal indicates samples from an auxiliary dataset,
instead of from the clients. Since the federated learning always
requires a testing set to evaluate the learning process, and
the testing set tends to consistent to the global distribution
of all the clients, we could adopt such testing set as real data
to implement the real-fake task. The CE(·) denotes the cross
entropy. Updating D will minimize Lreal+Lid, and updating
G will minimize Lcat −Lreal + Lid. The training process of
mGAN-AI will not affect the federated learning, thus referred
to as passive attack whose training scheme will be detailed in
the next section.
C. Passive Attack
In the passive attack, the malicious server is assumed to be
honest-but-curious, meaning that it only analyzes the updates
from the clients, rather than modifying the shared model or in-
troducing adversarial influence. The training scheme is briefed
in Algorithm 1. The shared model M , discriminator D, and
generator G are initialized randomly. The inputs to mGAN-
AI are the shared model Mt and updates ukt (k = 1, 2, · · · , N
and N ≥ 2) from the kth client at each iteration t. Besides, an
auxiliary set Xaux is prepared for the training, and a victim
indexed by v is specified.
At the tth iteration, the current shared model Mt is sent
to the clients, then the clients send the updates back to the
server. Following the rule of federated learning, those updates
are averaged and added to Mt, obtaining the shared model
for the next iteration. The discriminator D is initialized by
Mt + u
v
t at each iteration to keep updated to the latest per-
formance of categorization and to bias D towards the victim,
assisting the attack targeting the victim. As aforementioned
that the identification task requires the samples/representatives
from each client. The data representatives are calculated from
those updates of the clients (for more details, please refer to
section V-E). Finally, D and G are updated sequentially based
on the objectives in Eq. 4, where the auxiliary set Xaux is
considered as the real data, and the generated samples Xfake
by G are the fake data. The two datasets are fed to Lreal,
achieving the real-fake task. For the identification task (i.e.,
Lid), the representatives from uvt is treated as samples from
the victim, and those from ukt (k 6= v) are from others.
Algorithm 1: Passive attack of mGAN-AI
Input: The shared model Mt, updates ukt from clients,
auxiliary set Xaux, and target client v.
Output: The generator G
Initialize M0, G, and D
for t = 0 to T do
Send Mt to the clients
Receive updates from the clients,
{u1t , u2t , · · · , uvt , · · · , uNt }
Update the shared model using the updates,
Mt+1 =Mt +
1
N
N∑
k=1
ukt ;
Initialize D by the shared model and update uvt ,
D ←Mt + uvt
for k=1 to N do
Calculate data representatives Xk from ukt
if k == v then
label Xk as victim
end
else
label Xk as others
end
end
Get fake samples Xfake from G
Update D by minimizing Lreal + Lid, feeding Xaux,
Xfake, and Xk (k = 1, 2, · · · , N )
Update G by minimizing Lcat − Lreal + Lid
end
The update of D and G can be written as Eq. 5.
D = D − η1∇θD (Lreal + Lid)
G = G− η2∇θG(Lcat − Lreal + Lid),
(5)
where η1 and η2 denote the learning rates, and θD and θG
indicate the parameters of D and G, respectively.
To achieve better performance, a balanced training on D
is required, trained on balanced real and fake data. Since the
parameters of D are overwritten by the shared model which is
trained more on the real data as the time of iteration increases,
we propose to increase the training epoch of D as t increases,
thus to compensate the lack of fake data during the training.
The training will repeat until meeting the stop criteria: 1) the
federated learning reaches the maximum iteration, or 2) the
malicious server achieves desired results, i.e., the classification
accuracy of the generated samples from G converges above
certain threshold as tested on the shared model.
D. Active Attack
The passive attack is invisible but needs to analyze all
updates from the clients. A more efficient and powerful way
of attacking a specified client would be to isolate the victim
from the others, i.e., training mGAN-AI on the victim alone by
sending an isolated version of the shared model M iso to the
victim. Intuitively, it could be considered that the malicious
server contains an affiliated server that only connects to the
victim, and the shared model between them is M iso instead
of M . Initially, M iso0 = M0 = D, where M
iso and D share
the weights. Training mGAN-AI on the affiliated server by
following the similar training scheme to the passive attack, the
generator would yield samples with higher quality and more
distinguishable identity because mGAN-AI is trained purely
on the target real data. Note that the identification task (i.e.,
Lid), as well as the calculation of representatives of clients,
will be removed during the training because the victim is the
only client w.r.t. the affiliated server.
Since the malicious server will “actively” send M iso to
the victim to obtain specific information, we call it active
attack. Although the active attack violates the original rule
of federated learning, it does not introduce negative effect to
the federated learning.
E. Calculation of Client Representatives
In the identification task, data from the victim and other
clients are required to train the discriminator, while the sever
cannot directly access those data. Aono et al. [3] recovered
the client data based on the update from the client, which
is accessible for a malicious server in the federated learning.
However, it is only suitable for a simple setting, where the
shared model has to be a fully connected network, and the
update is required to be obtained by training on a single
sample. Obviously, these limitations significantly impede the
adaptation of [3] to those widely adopted learning methods,
e.g., convolution neural network, batch learning, etc. Inspired
by [3], we estimate the representative data of each client from
its update sent to the server. The representatives of a client
are defined to be synthesized samples that achieve the same
update as the real samples after trained on the shared model.
As described in section V-C, ukt is the update to the shared
model Mt after training the data of the kth client on Mt.
Specifically, ukt is obtained through backpropagation by min-
imizing the classification loss L on the shared model. By the
same token, the corresponding representatives Xk will be fed
to Mt and calculate the update uXkt through backpropagation
by minimizing the same loss L. Ideally, ukt = uXkt . We adopt
an optimization-based method to calculate Xk based on the
shared model, then the objective can be expressed as
argmin
Xk
‖ukt − uXkt ‖2, uXkt = −γ
∂L(Xk; θMt)
∂θMt
, (6)
where θMt denotes the parameters of the share model Mt, and
γ is a scaling factor for balancing the magnitude of uXkt . The
initial representatives are drawn from random noise.
Since optimization-based methods tend to introduce noise
or artifacts, Eq. 6 is further regularized by the total variation
(TV) [22] as expressed in the following.
LTV (Xk) =
∑
x∈Xk
∑
i,j
(
(xi,j+1 − xij)2 + (xi+1,j − xij)2
)β
,
(7)
where Xk is a set of images, and i, j are row and column
indices of the image x. The LTV computes the neighborhood
distance to encourage spatial smoothness of an image.
Finally, the objective of achieving valid representatives Xk
for the kth client is
argmin
Xk
∥∥∥ukt − uXkt ∥∥∥
2
+ λLTV (Xk), (8)
where λ balances the effect of TV. We calculate Xk by
using the box-constrained L-BFGS. Empirically, valid Xt
could be achieved after several updates. The experiments in
section VI validate the effectiveness of the representatives in
the identification task.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we first clarify the dataset and experiment
setup in Sec. VI-A. Then, effectiveness of the proposed
mGAN-AI is validated in Sec. VI-B. Finally, section VI-C con-
ducts qualitative and quantitative comparison between mGAN-
AI and another two typical attacks, i.e., the model inversion
(MI) attack and GAN-based attack.
A. Datasets and Experiment Setup
1) MNIST: It contains 70,000 handwritten digits images
from 0 to 9 (i.e., 10 classes). The images are in gray scale
with the size of 28×28, and they are divided into the training
set (60,000 samples) and testing set (10,000 samples).
2) AT&T: The AT&T dataset consists of facial images from
40 different persons, namely 10 images per person. The images
are in gray scale with the size of 92×112. They were taken
at different times and with large variation in facial expression
(smiling or w/o smiling) and facial details (glasses or w/o
glasses). We resize the images into 64×64.
3) Experiment setup: As discussed in Sec. V, the pro-
posed mGAN-AI involves three components: 1) classifier (i.e.,
the shared model), 2) discriminator, and 3) generator. The
classifier and discriminator are constructed by convolutional
neural networks, and they share the structure except the output
layer. The generator is constructed with deconvolution layers.
Tables I and II show the network structures for MNIST and
AT&T, respectively. For the generator, the kernel size is 5
with the stride of 2. The input to the generator is formated as
concatenation of random noise, categorical label, and identity
label (Fig. 3b), whose length are 100, 1, and 1, respectively.
The embedding layer squeezes the length of input to 100. For
the classifier and discriminator, the kernel size is 3× 3. Their
output has the similar format as the input of the generator, i.e.,
the first digits for reality, the next C digits for category, and the
last digit for identity. The C indicates the number of classes
for different datasets, i.e., C = 10 for MNIST and C = 40 for
AT&T. The activation functions ReLU and LReLU are adopted
in the generator and classifier/discriminator, respectively. In
addition, batch normalization is used at the intermediate layers
of the generator.
In the training of the classifier (i.e., shared model), the
SGD optimizer is adopted with the learning rate of 0.002.
For discriminator and generator (i.e., multi-task GAN), the
TABLE I: Network structure for MNIST
Classifier/
Discriminator
282 × 1 Conv (stride = 2)−−−−−−−−−→ 142 × 32 Conv (stride = 1)−−−−−−−−−→
142 × 64 Conv (stride = 2)−−−−−−−−−→ 72 × 128 Conv (stride = 1)−−−−−−−−−→
72 × 256 FC−−→ 12, 544 FC, Softmax−−−−−−→ (1, 10, 1)
Generator (100, 1, 1)
Embedding−−−−−−→ 100 FC−−→ 32 × 384 Deconv−−−−→
72 × 192 Deconv−−−−→ 142 × 96 Deconv, tanh−−−−−−−→ 282 × 1
TABLE II: Network structure for AT&T
Classifier/
Discriminator
642 × 1 Conv (stride = 2)−−−−−−−−−→ 322 × 32 Conv (stride = 1)−−−−−−−−−→
322 × 64 Conv (stride = 2)−−−−−−−−−→ 162 × 128 Conv (stride = 2)−−−−−−−−−→
82 × 256 FC−−→ 16, 384 FC, Softmax−−−−−−→ (1, 40, 1)
Generator
(100, 1, 1)
Embedding−−−−−−→ 100 FC−−→ 44 × 512 Deconv−−−−→
82 × 256 Deconv−−−−→ 162 × 128 Deconv−−−−→
322 × 256 Deconv−−−−→ 642 × 256 Deconv, tanh−−−−−−−→ 642 × 1
m2 × n denotes the size of a layer, i.e., m×m map with n channels.
Adam optimizer is used with the learning rate and momentum
term to be 0.0002 and 0.5, respectively. In calculating the
representatives, the box-constrained L-BFGS is employed,
where λ = 0.00015, β = 1.25.
B. Client-level Privacy Attack by mGAN-AI
This section evaluates the effectiveness of passive mGAN-
AI by comparing the reconstructed samples with the real sam-
ples of the victim. Instead of evenly splitting the training data
to the clients, we simulate biased data distribution on clients
according to the setting of federated learning. In addition,
opposite to [4] that assumed each client consists of a single
class, we achieve more flexible condition that each client could
own samples from multiple classes. Note that different clients
may share the samples from the same class.
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Fig. 4: The results of mGAN-AI on the MNIST dataset.
The first two rows are the real samples from the other
clients and the victim. The next two rows are corresponding
representatives calculated from other (Xk, k 6= v) and victim
(Xv). The last row is the reconstructed samples by mGAN-
AI, which are similar to those of the victim, presenting larger
rotation as compared to those of the other clients.
1) Evaluation on the MNIST dataset: We set the number of
client N = 10. Each client randomly draws 100 samples from
three random classes as its private data. To gain distinguishable
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Real samples 
of victim
Real samples 
of others
Representatives
 of victim
Representatives
 of others
Reconstructed 
samples of victim
Fig. 5: The results of mGAN-AI on the AT&T dataset. The top
two rows are real samples from the victim and other clients,
respectively. The corresponding representatives are shown in
the next two rows. The last row is the reconstructed samples,
which show that mGAN-AI would specifically recover client-
dependent property, i.e., wearing glasses.
properties for the victim, we rotate the samples of the victim
by InfoGAN [21], which could synthesize rotated version of
the digits. Ideally, mGAN-AI should reconstruct rotated digits
owned by the victim. Fig. 4 shows the reconstructed client-
level samples by mGAN-AI in the federated learning. The first
two rows are the samples from other clients and the victim,
respectively. The 3rd and 4th rows are the corresponding
representatives (Xk in Algorithm 1) calculated from other
clients and the victim. The last row shows the reconstructed
samples, which is indistinguishable from the second row
(victim) and different from the first row (other) in rotation
obviously. Note that ten classes are presented in Fig. 4 for the
victim because the experiment is repeated, so that the victim
could walk through all possible classes. This demonstrates that
mGAN-AI can successfully and precisely recover the provide
data of the victim, i.e., compromising the client-level privacy.
2) Evaluation on the AT&T dataset: The similar experi-
ment is performed on the AT&T dataset, where the number
of clients N = 10. The distinguishable property of the victim
is assigned to be wearing glasses. As shown in Fig. 5, the
first row shows the private data of the victim, i.e., two faces
wearing glasses. The second row are faces from other clients
that do not wear glasses. Note that the first two faces in the
second row are the same person as in the first row. Therefore,
successfully attack to the victim should be reconstruction of
the first two person wearing glasses. The 3rd and 4th rows are
corresponding representatives. The last row are reconstructed
samples, where the first two samples are identical to the victim
while the rest are significantly distorted. This demonstrates that
mGAN-AI could only clearly reconstruct the private data of
the victim, i.e., mGAN-AI specifically attacks the victim.
Note that mGAN-AI does not violate the differential privacy
Real 
images
Passive
mGAN-AI
Active
mGAN-AI
MI 
attack
GAN-based
attack
Fig. 6: Comparison of reconstructed samples by mGAN-AI,
MI attack, and GAN-based attack. The top row is the real
samples, and the rest are the reconstructed samples by the
passive mGAN-AI, active mGAN-AI, MI attack, and GAN-
based attack, respectively.
(DP), which aims to prevent the recovery of specific samples
used during the training. In other words, DP tries to make the
adversary fail to tell whether a given sample belongs to the
training set. However, without inferring the membership of a
given sample, it can still generate samples distinguishable from
real samples as demonstrated in Figs. 4 and 5, which obviously
leads severe privacy violation. Besides, convergence of the
shared model requires a relatively loose privacy budget when
applying DP in the federated learning [6], which means the
magnitude of the perturbation should be carefully controlled
to ensure high-utility updates used for training the multi-task
GAN in mGAN-AI.
C. Quantitative and Qualitative Comparison
This section compares mGAN-AI with two state-of-the-art
attacking models, i.e., inversion attack (MI) and GAN-based
attack, in aspects of reconstruction quality of the victim and
side effect to the federated learning. For fair comparison, the
same experiment setup is followed in the federated learning,
the same dataset AT&T is adopted, and the number of clients
N = 20. The results are shown in Fig. 6, where the first row
are real samples from the victim. The second and third rows
are passive attack and active attack of mGAN-AI, respectively.
The last two rows are reconstructions by MI attack and GAN-
based attack, respectively.
Comparing the results from the proposed mGAN-AI with
MI and GAN-based attack, mGAN-AI generates samples with
much higher quality and more identical to the real samples.
The results of MI attack is significantly blurry, consistent with
the results in [4], [17]. The failure is mainly caused by simply
maximizing the model output w.r.t. a target label, which would
lead to uninterpretable samples when dealing with complicated
TABLE III: Quantitative Comparison on Inception Score
Inception Score
Real Images 1.55 ± 0.04
Passive mGAN-AI 1.42 ± 0.02
Active mGAN-AI 1.61 ± 0.05
GAN-based attack 1.18 ± 0.03
MI attack 1.01 ± 0.03
neural networks. sharing the spirit with another threat for deep
learning — adversarial examples [23]. The results of GAN-
based attack do not converge at all because it heavily relies
on the introduced “adversarial influence” which would be
averaged (become trivial) before adding to the shared model.
The results of GAN-based attack are consistent with those in
its original work, where unrecognizable images were generated
without the adversarial influence. Comparing the passive and
active attack of mGAN-AI, the active attack performs better
but it would slightly degrade the learned model in the federated
learning. By contrast, the passive learning does not effect the
learning model, which will be demonstrated later.
To quantitatively evaluate the generated images, the incep-
tion score [24] is used to statistically compare the three attack
models. Inception score has been widely adopted in image
quality evaluation, especially in the area of image synthesis.
We generate 400 samples from each of the three attacks and
compute the inception score for each method. The results are
shown in Table III, where the proposed mGAN-AI shows
higher score than MI and GAN-based attack, demonstrating
that mGAN-AI generates samples with higher quality.
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Fig. 7: The accuracy of the shared model at each iteration in
the federated learning when mounting different attacks.
Finally, we investigate the side effect of the three attacking
models to the federated learning. Fig. 7 shows the accuracy of
the shared model at each iteration in the federated learning
when performing different attacks, i.e, passive mGAN-AI,
active mGAN-AI, and GAN-based attack. The GAN-based
attack significantly reduces the accuracy and presents drastic
oscillation (non convergence) because it introduces adversar-
ial influence. The passive mGAN-AI achieves the highest
accuracy because it does not affect the training process of
federated learning. The active mGAN-AI gets a bit lower but
stable accuracy. With this cost, however, it achieves better
reconstruction quality as shown in Fig. 6.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigated the privacy risk of federated learn-
ing, which is considered as a privacy-preserving learning
framework working in a decentralized manner. Against fed-
erated learning, we proposed a generic and practical recon-
struction attack named mGAN-AI, which enables a malicious
server to not only reconstruct the actual training samples,
but also target a specific client and compromise the client-
level privacy. The proposed attack does not affect the standard
training process, showing obvious advantages over the current
attack mechanisms. The extensive experimental results on two
benchmark datasets demonstrate that the mGAN-AI can re-
construct samples that resemble the victim’s training samples,
outperforming the state-of-the-art attacking algorithms.
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